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Abstract 
This paper will apply methods of probabilistic population forecasting to assess the range 
of uncertainty of China’s future population trends. Unlike previous applications of 
probabilistic population projections that consider stochastic future fertility, mortality 
and migration, this paper will also account for the significant uncertainty of China’s 
current fertility level (with estimates ranging from 1.2 to 2.3) and the related 
uncertainties about the sex ratio at birth (with estimates from 1.06 to above 1.2) and the 
size of the youngest cohorts in the 2000 census. The model applied in this paper will be 
based on expert based uncertainty ranges for current conditions, in addition to the 
probabilistic treatment of future trends. Given the sheer size of China’s population, 
these significant uncertainties about current conditions are of high importance not only 
for the future population of China but also on a global scale. 
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China’s Uncertain Demographic Present and Future 
Wolfgang Lutz 
Sergei Scherbov 
Gui Ying Cao 
Qiang Ren 
Xiaoying Zheng 
Introduction 
Trends in China’s population are directly relevant to what happens with the world’s 
population. More than with any other country, the sheer size of China’s population – which 
constitutes around 20 percent of the world’s total – makes it a key determinant of global 
population trends. In this light it is surprising how much uncertainty exists about the current 
demographic conditions in the world’s biggest country. Recently published estimates of 
China’s total fertility rate around 2000 range from 1.22 (NSB 2002a, 2000b) to 2.0 (Zhang 
Weimin and Cui Hongyan 2003) – a remarkable difference, especially seen on a relative scale 
(a factor of 1.64). There are probably few countries in the world where estimates about 
current fertility rates differ by such a factor. 
Because of China’s weight in the world population, the estimates of the current global 
fertility rates are significantly affected by this uncertainty, as are projections for the world 
population. If fertility in China were currently below 1.5, as many authors estimate and the 
UN publishes in its 2004 fertility data sheet (UN 2005), instead of the 1.85 assumed by the 
UN in its recent long range projections (UN 2004), this would influence the assumed fertility 
level over the coming decades and result in markedly lower projected rates of population 
growth (shrinking later in the century) both in China and the world. 
Fertility is not the only uncertain demographic condition in China today. Estimates for 
the sex ratio at birth range from 113 (Wang 2003) to 123 (Ma 2004). This is a remarkable 
difference that will significantly influence the future proportion of men to women in the adult 
population and hence population dynamics. 
Important uncertainty also exists around the size of the youngest age group. The size 
of the age group 0-4 in 2000 is given as 71 million in the census, but is estimated to be 86 
million (Zhang Weimin et al. 2004). The difference of 15 million in just one age group is not 
only daunting in absolute numbers but also represents a sizeable relative difference of 20 
percent. 
This paper will first discuss how demographers have traditionally dealt with the issue 
of uncertainty about current conditions – which was mostly by ignoring it – and about future 
trends and the options for systematically including quantitative information about this 
uncertainty in population estimates and projections. We then discuss the wide range of 
estimates about China’s current fertility level, sex ratio, and the size of the younger 
population. Next, we consider the range of future fertility (including the sex ratio), mortality, 
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and migration that should be reflected in our projections and carry out probabilistic 
projections which cover both the uncertainty of current conditions and future trends. The final 
sections will present and discuss the results and draw some conclusions. 
How Demographers Deal with Uncertainty about Current Conditions 
and Future Trends 
To be uncertain about the exact size and age structure of a population or the current level of 
fertility, mortality, and migration, is nothing new for demographers. Almost all empirical 
information, be it from censuses, vital registration or surveys, is imperfect, but the degree of 
imperfection varies significantly from one setting to another. The typical response to such 
imperfection on a minor scale has been to settle for one number (and publish it in an 
authoritative volume) and then quickly try to forget that this number is indeed associated with 
uncertainties. In the rare cases that these published numbers are publicly challenged or when 
the demographers themselves feel that the degree of imperfection of the given empirical 
information is intolerable as a basis for analysis and interpretation, demographers tend to have 
two alternative strategies: either go out to the field and collect new information or use various 
kinds of statistical techniques to improve the given data. Sometimes both methods are 
combined, but the goal is typically the same: to come up with one point estimate that should 
be as close as possible to the real world. In international comparisons, these point estimates 
typically enter tables where, e.g., the highly reliable estimate for life expectancy derived from 
the Finnish population register stands next to the estimate for Mozambique, where hardly 
anything is known about current mortality conditions, especially in the face of unknown HIV 
prevalence. 
Typically the user of such internationally comparative tables is not given any 
indication about differential uncertainties surrounding these point estimates. But even if the 
researchers working with the data are painfully aware of the uncertainty of a given point 
estimate, they mostly see no other choice than to base their projections and other analyses on 
this uncertain point estimate of demographic conditions at a given time. It is considered better 
to have one imperfect number which roughly characterizes the actual situation than to have no 
number at all. 
Unlike some other disciplines, there is no tradition in demography to process fuzzy 
information and yet be able to maintain the information about the uncertainty of a given 
indicator in the subsequent steps of the analysis. In this paper we propose to do so by 
expanding methods of probabilistic population projections to include uncertainty distributions 
of the starting conditions of the projections. 
The field of probabilistic population projections has recently seen a dynamic 
development. In 2004 the International Statistical Review published a special issue on how to 
deal with uncertainty in population forecasting (Lutz and Goldstein 2004). It presents a state 
of the art summary of different dimensions of and different approaches to probabilistic 
population projections. It also shows how dynamically the field has been expanding since 
Frontiers of Population Forecasting (Lutz et al. 1999b) and the National Research Council 
(2000) report on population projections were written. There is no space here to review this 
field of studies. It should only be mentioned that originally there were three rather different 
approaches, which recently have seen some convergence. The first one is based on the 
analysis of errors in past population projections and the assumption that future errors will be 
similar to past errors (Alho 1997; Keilman 1999; Lee 1999). The second approach is largely 
based on time series analysis and produces stochastic projections on the assumption of 
structural continuity and constant variability (Lee 1993; Lee and Tuljapurkar 1994). The third 
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approach largely rests on subjective probability distributions produced by experts in the 
process of an argument-based discussion process about the likely future range of uncertainty 
in fertility, mortality, and migration (Lutz et al. 1997, 1999a). While the first two approaches 
usually distinguish between assumptions on the trend (which is mostly based on expert 
opinion) and the variance (which is derived from past errors or time series), under the third 
approach, trend and variance are assumed jointly as being part of the same uncertain process. 
There is considerable debate at the moment about which of the three approaches is the 
most appropriate under different conditions of data availability, stages in the process of 
demographic transition, and other contextual conditions. This discussion, which seems to 
move in the direction of combining elements of the different approaches and is summarized in 
Lutz and Goldstein (2004) has not yet resulted in a broad methodological consensus and is 
unlikely to do so in the near future because of the great variety of conditions under which 
such projections are being produced. In the context of this study on China, it is important to 
note that the full range of options is not applicable for all countries. The use of past projection 
errors is only applicable for populations for which both a series of past projections and 
reliable empirical data for verification exist. The time series approach can only be pursued if 
sufficiently long, high-quality time series are available. These preconditions significantly 
limit the number of countries to which all three methods are applicable. As discussed in detail 
below, China clearly does not meet these preconditions. 
Methodologically, this paper goes an important step beyond previous probabilistic 
projections in applying the probabilistic approach not only to capture the future uncertainty 
but also to address the uncertainty about current conditions. For this task the approaches other 
than subjective probabilities based on expert knowledge are not applicable. The time series 
approach depends on reliable empirical data by its very nature and is meaningless without 
them, hence, by definition it cannot be applied to uncertain empirical information. The 
approach of learning from past errors could theoretically be expanded to refer to errors about 
point estimates that have later been revised as better empirical information has become 
available. But this would have to be based on the very strong assumption that there is a 
universal pattern of biases when producing point estimates under conditions of uncertainty 
about the real level of demographic indicators. There is no reason to assume that there is such 
a universal and predictable pattern of biases in estimating current fertility levels, sex ratios or 
age group sizes that would hold for all countries and times. Hence, the only alternative is to 
look carefully at what some of the best experts in the country under consideration and the 
entire scientific literature have to say in terms of different attempts to estimate current 
demographic conditions and then infer an uncertainty distribution from this informed 
judgment. 
Uncertainty Ranges of Current Demographic Conditions in China 
Current fertility level 
Table 1 gives a long list of more than 30 different estimates of China’s total fertility rate 
(TFR) around 2000 that have recently been published. This sheer number of different values 
estimated for a situation in which only one number can be true gives an indication of the 
uncertainty as well as the controversy surrounding the current fertility level in China. In this 
study we will restrict our consideration to published estimates. The number of unpublished 
estimates produced by different institutions or individuals is probably much greater. These 
published estimates of the total fertility rate in China in 2000 span a range from 1.22 (NSB 
2002a, 2000b) to 2.0 (Zhang Weimin et al. 2004). All the other estimates that are based on a 
transparent rationale lie between these values but are clearly not evenly distributed. 
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Table 1.  Different estimates of the total fertility rate for China in 2000. 
Source TFR Notes 
Wang 
Jinying 
(2003) 
1.718(1); 
1.703(2); 
1.723(3) 
(1) Uncorrected fertility pattern: calculation directly by age-
specific fertility rate of 2000 census without considering the 
underreporting of children; (2) Adjustment by reconstructing the 
underreporting of children: to keep age-parity-specific rate of 
2000 census stable, re-estimate the fertility pattern after 
reconstructing those children who are underreported in the 
census; (3) Adjustment by fertility pattern of the second child: 
due to the serious underreporting of the second child, re-estimate 
the fertility pattern of the second child by reconstructing those 
children who are underreported in the census. 
Liang 
Zhongtang 
(2003) 
2.3  
Yuan Jianhua 
et al. (2003) 
1.71(1); 
1.78(2);  
1.63(3) 
(1) Calculation by National Statistical Yearbook; (2) Statistics of 
State Family Planning Committee; (3) Using the surviving 
method for children aged 0-10 years in 2000, the number of 
births has been estimated for each year assuming a life 
expectancy in 1990 of 67.767 for males and 71.15 for females, 
and in 2000 of 69.54 for males and 73.01 for females. 
CPIC (2003) 1.80  
NSB (2002a, 
2000b) 
1.22  
Zhang 
Weimin et al. 
(2004) 
1.63(1); 
2.0(2) 
(1) Adjustment by the underreporting rate of 18.94% for 0-9 
years old; (2) Assuming the number of population aged 10-19 
years old is correct, the underreporting rate for children aged 0-9 
years old is 13.68%, the adjusted TFR is 2.0 assuming the 
underreporting rate is the same between 1990 and 2000. 
Zhai Zhenwu 
(2003) 
1.8  
Guo Zhigang 
(2003, 2004) 
1.58 Calculation by author eliminating tempo effects. 
Zhang 
Guangyu 
(2003, 2004) 
1.5~1.6  
Retherford et 
al. (2004) 
1.36(1); 
1.38(2); 
1.58(3) 
(1) Calculation by own-children method; (2) Calculation by 
birth history reconstruction; (3) Adjustment by a factor from the 
comparison between the 1990 and 2000 censuses. 
Ding Junfeng 
(2003) 
1.35  
Guo Zhigang 
(2004) 
1.23(1); 
1.3(2) 
(1) Calculation by the method of children-mother match with 
2000 census, 1% microdata; (2) Author’s opinion based on 
actual reflected TFR from national survey and census. 
SFPC (2002) 1.45  
Cui Hongyan 
and Zhang 
Weimin 
(2002) 
1.3  
Yu Xuejun 
(2002) 
1.55(1)； 
1.32(2); 
1.6-1.8(3) 
(1) Estimated by the number of population from 2000 census 
data; (2) Estimated by the number of children from 2000 census 
data; (3) Estimated by author. 
ESCAP (2002) 1.8  
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U.S. Bureau 
of the Census 
(2004) 
1.7  
Zhang 
Weimin and 
Cui Hongyan 
(2003) 
1.38(1); 
1.63(2),  
2.0(3); 
1.8(4) 
(1) Calculation using only the census long form; (2) Lower limit 
value; (3) Upper limit value; (4) Author’s estimated round value. 
SFPC (2001) 1.8  
 
 
To put things into a temporal perspective, Table 2 gives the times series for the TFR 
since the mid-1980s from five independent sources of data. These show considerable 
variation, but all give values of below 1.5 since the mid-1990s. There is, however, widespread 
agreement among experts that they all tend to be subject to underreporting of births, 
particularly in the years immediately preceding the census/survey. The critical question is 
what degree of underreporting is being assumed, and accordingly, what correction factors 
should be applied? This is where the alternative estimates for the TFR around 2000 differ. 
 
Table 2.  Total fertility rate for China since 1990. Sources: Cited from Guo Zhigang (2004). 
Year NSB1 1992 
Survey2 
1997 
Survey3 
2001 
Survey4 
2000 
Census5 
1986 2.42 2.46 2.59   
1987 2.59 2.57 2.66   
1988 2.31 2.28 2.41   
1989 2.25 2.24 2.40   
1990 2.17 2.04 2.29 2.29 2.37 
1991 2.01 1.66 1.75 1.77 1.80 
1992 1.86 1.47 1.57 1.59 1.68 
1993 1.71  1.51 1.52 1.57 
1994 1.56  1.32 1.41 1.47 
1995 1.43  1.33 1.45 1.48 
1996 1.55  1.35 1.36 1.36 
1997 1.46   1.27 1.31 
1998 1.11   1.34 1.31 
1999 1.45   1.29 1.23 
2000    1.45 1.23 
1
 NSB (1988-2000) 
2
 Yu Jingyuan and Yuan Jianhua (1996) 
3
 Guo Zhigang (2000) 
4
 Ding Junfeng (2003) 
5
 Guo Zhigang (2004) 
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There is no space here for a detailed discussion of the rationales and methods of the 
individual estimates. These are well documented in the studies themselves. For defining an 
uncertainty distribution of fertility around the year 2000, we considered two alternative 
approaches: (1) Simply give every study equal weight and calculate the mean and variance of 
the distribution of different estimates, which then are used to define a normal distribution. (2) 
Try to exert some judgment about which studies are more authoritative than others and have 
the distribution informed by that choice. While the first rather mechanistic approach is 
intellectually unsatisfactory because it gives no room for quality judgments, the second is in 
danger of being too dependent on our personal (possibly biased) judgment about quality. 
After extensive considerations and discussions (including those at a high level forum on low 
fertility in East Asia held in Beijing in May 2005), we reached a compromise between the two 
alternative approaches. It was decided to use the Retherford et al. (2004) estimate for the TFR 
of around 1.5, based on a systematic application of the own-children method, as the median of 
a normal distribution which covers 95 percent in the range between 1.2 and 1.8. This 
uncertainty range with a symmetric distribution around 1.5 found the broadest consensus 
among the experts that were involved in the discussions. In the projections, the TFR value for 
2000 (the starting year of the projections) was randomly chosen from this distribution for each 
of the 1,000 independent cohort component projection runs. 
As to the future, the uncertainty interval for fertility was assumed to open up a bit for 
the coming decades. Since it is unclear whether the fertility level in China will continue to fall 
or whether it will recover as a consequence of government policies that aim at stabilizing 
fertility around 1.8-1.9, the assumed 95 percent uncertainty range will go to 1.0-2.0 by 2030 
(with linear interpolation between 2000 and 2030). After 2030 the range was assumed to shift 
slightly upwards to 1.2-2.2 in accordance with the substantive considerations discussed in 
Lutz et al. (2004). The assumed uncertainty distribution for TFR is graphically depicted in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Assumed uncertainty distribution for the total fertility rate of China. 
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Sex ratio at birth 
Tables 3 to 5 provide different estimates of the sex ratio at birth in 2000, another uncertain 
and highly controversial demographic variable. Table 3 indicates that the problem of biased 
sex ratios is particularly strong for higher parities. Table 4 reflects that the trend of biased sex 
ratios has become more serious since the mid-1980s. Since we only need the total sex ratio for 
the projections, we focus on the data given in Table 5. It gives seven different estimates of the 
sex ratio at birth in 2000 that range from 1.13 to 1.23. We decided to operationalize this 
uncertainty range by assuming a normal distribution with 95 percent between 1.13 and 1.23. 
Over time we assume that by 2030 a normal sex ratio at birth of 1.05 will be reached with 
linear interpolation between 2000 and 2030. 
 
Table 3.  Sex ratio at birth by parity, 1989, 1994, 2000. Data for 1989 and 2000 are taken 
from NSB (1993, 2002b); data for 1994 are taken from NSB (1997). 
Year Total First Child Second Child Third Child and Above 
1989 111.3 105.2 121.0 127.0 
1994 115.6 106.4 141.1 154.3 
2000 116.9 107.1 151.9 159.4 
 
Table 4.  Historical trends in the sex ratio at birth in China, 1953-2000. Sources: Gu 
Baochang and Xu Yi (1994) for 1960-1992; Lu Hongping (2003) for 1993-2000. 
Year Sex Ratio at birth Year Sex Ratio at birth Year Sex Ratio at birth 
1953 104.9 1973 107.3 1987 111.0 
1960 110.3 1974 106.6 1988 108.1 
1961 108.8 1975 106.4 1989 111.3 
1962 106.6 1976 107.4 1990 114.7 
1963 107.1 1977 106.7 1991 116.1 
1964 106.6 1978 105.9 1992 114.2 
1965 106.2 1979 105.8 1993 114.1 
1966 112.2 1980 107.4 1994 116.3 
1967 106.6 1981 107.1 1995 117.4 
1968 102.5 1982 107.2 1996 118.5 
1969 104.5 1983 107.9 1997 120.4 
1970 105.9 1984 108.5 1998 122.1 
1971 105.2 1985 111.4 1999 122.7 
1972 107.0 1986 112.3 2000 119.9 
 
Table 5.  Different estimates for the sex ratio at birth in 2000. 
Source Sex Ratio at Birth 
Wang Jinying (2003) 113.40 
SPFPC and CPDC (2003) 116.86 
NSB (2002b) 117.79 
Ma Yingtong (2004) 122.65 
Lu Hongping (2003) 119.9 
Judith Banister (2002) 120 
Zhang Weimin and Cui 
Hongyan (2003) 
>=115 
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The distorted sex ratio at birth is very clearly visible from the asymmetry of the age 
pyramid in Figure 2. The projection results (see Figure 3) show this asymmetry, particularly 
for the cohorts born in 1985 and (following our assumptions) in 2030. Since fertility rates are 
only applied to women, this distorted sex ratio has a dampening effect on population growth. 
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Figure 2.  Probabilistic age pyramid, 2000. 
Size of youngest age groups 
The third kind of uncertainty of starting conditions which was considered explicitly here 
concerns the age structure, and in particular, the relative size of the youngest age groups. 
Table 6 provides the age distribution as given by the official census data. Again there is 
reason to assume that it includes significant underreporting of children that corresponds to the 
underreporting of births in the measurement of recent fertility. This underreporting becomes 
evident when producing projections of the Chinese population based on the starting year 1990 
and when applying alternative fertility rates considered plausible. 
There also have been several attempts to correct the age structure of the 2000 census 
although the number of such efforts has been much smaller than the number of different 
fertility estimates. We decided not to systematically study these correction attempts of the age 
structure because we would have no direct use of them in our probabilistic population 
projections. This is due to the necessary consistency between our assumptions on the level of 
fertility in 2000 and the size of the youngest age group in that year. If we choose a rather high 
fertility level from our uncertainty distribution of the 2000 TFRs, we also need to choose a 
size of the youngest age group that is comparatively larger because it was produced by these 
higher fertility rates over the past few years. 
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Table 6.  Age distribution of the 2000 census, adjustment by Jiang and Ren. The number of 
the population (20.72 million) was distributed into different age groups in order to make the 
total number of the population equal to 1.26583 billion. Source: Jiang Leiwen and Ren Qiang 
(2005). 
 Male Female Total 
0-4 39080442  32330340  71410782 
5-9 50803287  44105742  94909029 
10-14 68852541  63165421  132017961 
15-19 51910244  48709494  100619739 
20-24 44167951  44101447  88269398 
25-29 57358164  56362758  113720922 
30-34 63871217  62751382  126622599 
35-39 56371339  54871791  111243130 
40-44 43225101  40999383  84224484 
45-49 45995722  44185113  90180835 
50-54 34357617  32420433  66778051 
55-59 25405390  23864012  49269402 
60-64 22783865  21047268  43831133 
65-69 18515844  18251975  36767820 
70-74 13059340  13791954  26851294 
75-79 7541698  9210723  16752421 
80-84 3409902  4890141  8300043 
85-89 1090862  1992949  3083811 
90+ 274580  702567  977147 
Total 648075107  617754893  1265830000 
 
 
In order to deal with this consistency issue between the chosen level of TFR and the 
size of the youngest age groups, we designed a specific routine that calculates a separate age 
distribution for the year 2000 for each of the 1,000 separate simulation runs. This routine is 
based on the assumption that underreporting primarily affects children below school age. It 
assumes that the number of seven year old girls and boys reported in the census is more or 
less correct (of course, the method can also be applied assuming a higher age at which 
underreporting of children stops). Based on this assumption, we were able to calculate which 
level of TFR in 1993 produces the given number of children of that age group. Next, for each 
simulation run, a TFR value for 2000 was randomly chosen. Then for each simulation, the 
following calculations were performed:  A linear interpolation was applied between the TFR 
estimated for 1993 and the one assumed for 2000. The resulting TFRs were then applied to a 
projection that reproduced the number of births between 1993 and 2000. Applying plausible 
child mortality rates produced a new age structure for the year 2000. As a result, for each 
simulation run we have a separate age structure for children, which is exactly consistent with 
the fertility level chosen for the specific run. 
Figure 2 (above) shows the resulting uncertainty distribution of the age pyramid of 
China in 2000. The green area shows the age-specific uncertainties due to the alternatively 
estimated age distributions. 
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Projections 
For the projection methodology itself, we chose the same approach as extensively discussed 
in Lutz et al. (2004). It is a stochastic simulation with annual fluctuations of vital rates within 
a variance as defined by expert opinion. The trends and the assumed ranges follow the same 
logic as in Lutz et al. (2004); we do not have room to discuss them here. In short, for fertility 
a normal distribution was assumed with a mean of 1.5 and 95 percent of all cases in the range 
between 1.0 and 2.0 before 2030, and after that with a mean of 1.7 and 95 percent of all future 
cases in the range between 1.2 and 2.2. This assumption implies that there is a chance that 
five percent will fall outside this range on either side. For morality the starting life expectancy 
for 2000 was assumed to be 69.7 years for men and 74.5 years for women. We took this as a 
point estimate without explicit consideration of uncertainty. For the future, however, we 
assumed that life expectancy would on average increase by two years per decade with 95 
percent of the uncertainty distribution falling between an increase of only one year and three 
years per decade. This implies that for 2050 the ranges for life expectancy at birth go from 
74.7 to 84.7 for men and from 79.5 to 89.5 for women. We also assumed a closed population, 
i.e., no net migration gains or losses. 
Results 
Figures 3 to 7 show the results of 1,000 simulations, each a separate cohort-component 
projection with the starting conditions as well as fertility, sex ratio at birth, and mortality 
drawn from the uncertainty distributions as described above. The figures present the results in 
terms of fractiles of the resulting distributions. The orange area gives the range into which 95 
percent of the simulated cases fall, the green area the 60 percent range, the blue area the inner 
20 percent, and the white line in the center gives the median. 
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Figure 3.  Probabilistic age pyramid, 2050. 
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Figure 3 shows the probabilistic age pyramid for China in 2050. To the left it lists the 
single years of age and to the right the corresponding years of birth of the cohort. For all 
cohorts below age 50, i.e., those born after 2000, the broad band of uncertainty reflects the 
combination of uncertain fertility in 2000 and uncertain future fertility trends. For the 
youngest cohorts, this uncertainty range is quite significant with the 95 percent interval going 
from around 2.5 million girls to 7.5 million girls; the difference is a factor of three. For those 
aged 50-70 in 2050, the uncertainty range is the smallest. This is because these cohorts are 
already born and the cohort size is roughly known (subject only to the uncertainty about the 
current age distribution as discussed above) and they have not yet entered the high mortality 
ages when the uncertainty about future old-age mortality comes to bear. It is also remarkable 
that as a consequence of the Chinese demographic history, these very large age groups born 
between 1985 and 1990 are not only the biggest cohorts today, but will also be by far the 
biggest cohorts in 2050. And as the figure illustrates, there is very little uncertainty about this. 
 
China, Total Population
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
20
35
20
40
20
45
20
50
20
55
20
60
20
65
20
70
20
75
20
80
20
85
20
90
20
95
21
00
Year
To
ta
l P
op
ul
at
io
n 
(bi
lli
on
s
)
0.8
0.4
0.2
0.025
0.975
Median
0.6
Fractiles
Sergei's DELL PIII, file: D:\D_dell\IIASA2005\China\Office2003\[presentation02_2_for_China_tmp2.xls],01-Jun-05    15:22
 
Figure 4.  Fractiles of distribution for total population, 2000-2100. 
 
Figure 4 shows the resulting uncertainty distribution for total population size. The 
median of the distribution shows further growth until reaching a peak of 1.38 billion in 2020-
2030 and then starts to slowly decline. In 2050 the median is already down to 1.25 billion. But 
as can be expected the uncertainty range opens with the passage of time. The upper 0.975 
fractile keeps growing until around 2035, reaching almost 1.5 billion; the lower 0.025 fractile 
starts to go down in 2015 after having reached a peak of 1.30 billion. The 95 percent range in 
2050 goes from 1.10 billion to 1.54 billion. 
Figure 5 shows the proportion of people below age 15. Here it is clearly visible that 
the uncertainty about the size of the youngest age groups today, together with the uncertainty 
of the current level of fertility, cause a quite unusual distribution up to 2025 after which point 
the pattern becomes more regular and essentially reflects the uncertainty of future fertility 
levels. Comparing this figure to the age pyramid (Figure 3), it is evident that the proportion of 
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children in the population is less uncertain than the absolute number of children. This is 
because in the case of a high fertility trajectory, both the number of children and the total 
population will be higher. 
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Figure 5.  Fractiles of distribution for proportion below age 15, 2000-2100. 
 
China, Old-Age Dependency Ratio (65+ / 15-65)
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Figure 6.  Fractiles of distribution for old-age dependency ratio, 2000-2100. 
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Figure 6 shows the old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-65). This graph shows a most 
dramatic increase with very little uncertainty until around 2035. The old-age dependency ratio 
is almost certain to triple in only over three decades. This can be said with high confidence as 
the 95 percent uncertainty range is very narrow, a consequence of the fact that much of this 
increase is already preprogrammed in today’s age structure. And even considering the 
uncertainty about this age structure does not change this pattern significantly. By around 2050 
the old-age dependency ratio is expected to increase by almost a factor of five. 
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Figure 7.  Fractiles of distribution for proportion above age 80, 2000-2100. 
 
Figure 7 gives a long term view on the possible size of the very old population in 
China, namely, those above age 80. Currently only around one percent of the total population 
of China belongs to this age group. This group is expected to gradually increase over the 
coming few decades to around three percent in 2030 with very little uncertainty. But over the 
decades 2030-2050, it is likely to see a marked increase reaching around 10 percent by the 
middle of the century, i.e., 10 times its current size. Much of this increase is already 
embedded in the current age structure of the population due to the strong cohorts born around 
1970. Another significant push in the proportion above age 80 is expected before 2070 when 
it is likely to jump to close to 15 percent of the total population because the very big cohorts 
born in the mid-1980s will reach this high age. Of course, the uncertainty range around this 
median projection significantly broadens during the second half of the century. Like in most 
other low fertility countries in the world, the future course of old-age mortality is highly 
uncertain. If the proponents of an unabated increase in life expectancy are correct, then China 
may well have a quarter of its total population above the age of 80 by the end of the century. 
If the “pessimists” are correct, this proportion would still increase to between 10 and 15 
percent of the population. 
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Conclusions 
This paper has demonstrated that over the coming decades, the world’s biggest national 
population will experience some of the most rapid and most massive processes of population 
aging in world history. Neither the current uncertainty about the level of fertility, the sex ratio, 
the number of children already born, nor the uncertainty about future vital rates significantly 
weakens this very robust forecast. 
When it comes to population size, however, the uncertainties considered do have quite 
some impact. The projections show that there is about an 80 percent chance that by the end of 
the century, China’s population size will again fall below one billion, even though over the 
coming decades we will see further increase due to the momentum caused by a young age 
structure. Almost certainly (with more than 97.5 percent probability) China’s population will 
surpass 1.3 billion over the next decades or so. The point at which it will begin to fall greatly 
depends on the assumptions made about current and future fertility trends as discussed. Our 
projections show that almost certainly (more than 97.5 percent) the population will not reach 
1.5 billion. The median shows a peak of 1.377 around 2025. After that, the population starts 
to decline with the median in 2100 showing 850 million people, almost 40 percent below its 
peak level. 
China is currently benefiting from a very low total dependency ratio. There are few 
children and not yet many elderly. This demographic window of opportunity, which is also 
one factor behind the currently very high economic growth rates, will close in the foreseeable 
future. Our projections show that there is no uncertainty that the old-age dependency burden 
will dramatically increase over the coming decades. This will pose serious challenges for 
China’s social and economic structure and needs to be addressed soon because such 
institutional adjustments take time. 
This expected population aging and shrinking will also have significant impacts on the 
projected global trends. Contrary to earlier world population projections, fertility is now being 
assumed to lie in the 1.4-1.5 range around the year 2000 rather than in the 1.8-1.9 range as 
previously assumed, which will result in lower projected global population sizes. In its recent 
long range projections (still based on a 2000 TFR of 1.8) the UN Population Division projects 
a population for China of 1.395 billion in 2050 and 1.181 billion in 2100 (UN 2004). In its 
2004 fertility data sheet, the UN gives a TFR estimate of 1.4 for 2001 (UN 2005). This has 
not yet been implemented into their published projections. Based on these newer assumptions, 
our projections presented here show that the population of China would likely be 334 million 
less in 2100 than the number given in the UN long range projections. This implies that the 
world population size would have to be corrected downwards by 0.33 billion in 2100. 
This paper has also shown that existing methods of expert-based probabilistic 
forecasting can readily be expanded to include uncertainty about the current demographic 
conditions. They provide a comprehensive tool to jointly consider all sources of uncertainty 
that can influence the evolution of population age and structure over time. To the user they 
can provide an easy to understand summary of all expert knowledge and expert judgment on 
what can be said about likely future population patterns and the degree of confidence with 
which such information should be seen. 
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Appendix Tables 
China, proportion below age 15 
Ind Interval Sex 2004 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095 2100 
prop 0-15 0.025 tot 0.187 0.178 0.150 0.138 0.131 0.118 0.098 0.086 0.081 0.083 0.084 0.078 0.075 0.074 0.076 0.078 0.076 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.075 
prop 0-15 0.2 tot 0.195 0.187 0.165 0.155 0.148 0.136 0.117 0.107 0.104 0.105 0.103 0.099 0.097 0.098 0.102 0.102 0.101 0.100 0.100 0.101 0.100 
prop 0-15 0.4 tot 0.200 0.192 0.173 0.165 0.159 0.144 0.126 0.116 0.115 0.117 0.116 0.112 0.109 0.110 0.113 0.114 0.114 0.113 0.114 0.115 0.114 
prop 0-15 0.6 tot 0.203 0.196 0.179 0.171 0.165 0.152 0.134 0.125 0.124 0.127 0.126 0.122 0.119 0.121 0.124 0.126 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.128 0.126 
prop 0-15 0.8 tot 0.207 0.200 0.186 0.179 0.174 0.162 0.144 0.136 0.136 0.138 0.137 0.133 0.131 0.135 0.138 0.140 0.140 0.138 0.139 0.140 0.142 
prop 0-15 0.975 tot 0.215 0.209 0.199 0.194 0.189 0.176 0.161 0.155 0.158 0.160 0.157 0.156 0.155 0.158 0.161 0.164 0.162 0.161 0.163 0.164 0.163 
                        
prop 0-15  mean 0.201 0.194 0.175 0.167 0.161 0.148 0.130 0.121 0.120 0.122 0.121 0.117 0.114 0.116 0.119 0.121 0.120 0.119 0.119 0.121 0.121 
prop 0-15  Median 0.201 0.194 0.176 0.168 0.162 0.149 0.130 0.120 0.120 0.122 0.121 0.117 0.115 0.116 0.119 0.121 0.120 0.118 0.120 0.121 0.121 
prop 0-15  std 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.023 
China, life expectancy 
Ind Interval Sex 2004 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095 2100 
e0 0.025 tot 72.269 72.353 72.810 73.175 73.717 74.104 74.543 74.753 75.250 75.747 75.868 76.014 76.683 76.996 77.982 78.211 78.245 79.052 79.670 80.719 79.956 
e0 0.2 tot 72.524 72.674 73.448 74.169 74.891 75.686 76.364 76.951 77.641 78.446 79.188 79.958 80.818 81.562 82.264 83.114 83.789 84.638 85.744 86.603 87.041 
e0 0.4 tot 72.657 72.837 73.799 74.725 75.619 76.554 77.445 78.387 79.259 80.040 81.104 81.809 82.939 83.834 84.739 85.466 86.610 87.624 88.792 89.776 90.572 
e0 0.6 tot 72.779 73.003 74.084 75.141 76.262 77.318 78.417 79.520 80.488 81.469 82.438 83.527 84.637 85.729 86.873 87.923 88.887 90.347 91.163 92.426 93.473 
e0 0.8 tot 72.934 73.188 74.436 75.672 76.956 78.223 79.472 80.663 81.982 83.078 84.302 85.498 86.843 87.827 89.306 90.500 92.110 93.251 94.735 95.920 97.272 
e0 0.975 tot 73.183 73.523 75.079 76.816 78.385 79.939 81.413 83.306 84.980 86.033 87.800 89.350 90.821 92.467 94.082 95.366 97.129 98.745 101.077 101.758 103.471 
                        
e0  mean 72.721 72.926 73.939 74.942 75.962 76.979 77.946 78.915 79.883 80.796 81.760 82.741 83.782 84.743 85.791 86.774 87.842 89.001 90.144 91.190 92.075 
e0  Median 72.716 72.916 73.944 74.934 75.956 76.916 77.907 78.965 79.847 80.853 81.766 82.657 83.777 84.836 85.857 86.860 87.670 89.042 90.144 90.969 92.018 
e0  std 0.238 0.301 0.587 0.910 1.207 1.517 1.834 2.207 2.513 2.743 3.032 3.375 3.622 3.834 4.137 4.379 4.814 5.117 5.459 5.601 6.032 
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China, proportion 15-65 
Ind Interval Sex 2004 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095 2100 
prop 15-65 0.025 tot 0.709 0.713 0.716 0.708 0.689 0.682 0.666 0.633 0.599 0.577 0.551 0.507 0.485 0.468 0.459 0.445 0.427 0.417 0.411 0.405 0.403 
prop 15-65 0.2 tot 0.716 0.721 0.728 0.721 0.701 0.694 0.678 0.644 0.611 0.593 0.572 0.536 0.523 0.511 0.504 0.492 0.482 0.475 0.471 0.470 0.468 
prop 15-65 0.4 tot 0.719 0.725 0.735 0.727 0.707 0.700 0.683 0.650 0.618 0.602 0.583 0.551 0.539 0.530 0.526 0.519 0.507 0.501 0.499 0.500 0.496 
prop 15-65 0.6 tot 0.723 0.729 0.740 0.733 0.713 0.706 0.689 0.656 0.625 0.609 0.593 0.563 0.554 0.545 0.542 0.536 0.527 0.523 0.522 0.521 0.521 
prop 15-65 0.8 tot 0.727 0.733 0.747 0.741 0.721 0.713 0.695 0.662 0.632 0.618 0.602 0.576 0.569 0.564 0.562 0.556 0.549 0.544 0.545 0.545 0.543 
prop 15-65 0.975 tot 0.734 0.741 0.760 0.756 0.733 0.726 0.707 0.675 0.646 0.634 0.621 0.598 0.595 0.590 0.591 0.589 0.585 0.582 0.586 0.588 0.585 
                        
prop 15-65 mean 0.721 0.727 0.738 0.731 0.711 0.703 0.686 0.653 0.622 0.605 0.587 0.556 0.545 0.536 0.532 0.524 0.514 0.509 0.507 0.507 0.505 
prop 15-65 Median 0.721 0.727 0.737 0.730 0.710 0.703 0.686 0.652 0.621 0.605 0.588 0.557 0.546 0.538 0.534 0.526 0.516 0.513 0.512 0.510 0.508 
prop 15-65 std 0.006 0.007 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.015 0.018 0.023 0.028 0.032 0.034 0.037 0.040 0.043 0.045 0.046 0.047 
 
China, proportion above age 80 
Ind Interval Sex 2004 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095 2100 
prop 80+ 0.025 tot 0.011 0.012 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.022 0.028 0.037 0.042 0.053 0.067 0.076 0.073 0.076 0.093 0.092 0.091 0.086 0.088 0.093 0.097 
prop 80+ 0.2 tot 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.018 0.020 0.023 0.030 0.041 0.047 0.062 0.080 0.091 0.090 0.097 0.119 0.123 0.121 0.119 0.124 0.138 0.147 
prop 80+ 0.4 tot 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.018 0.021 0.024 0.031 0.044 0.051 0.067 0.088 0.101 0.102 0.111 0.137 0.143 0.144 0.141 0.150 0.165 0.175 
prop 80+ 0.6 tot 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.018 0.021 0.024 0.032 0.046 0.054 0.072 0.095 0.111 0.113 0.123 0.154 0.161 0.163 0.164 0.173 0.192 0.205 
prop 80+ 0.8 tot 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.019 0.022 0.025 0.034 0.048 0.058 0.078 0.104 0.123 0.128 0.143 0.175 0.187 0.195 0.197 0.208 0.228 0.241 
prop 80+ 0.975 tot 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.019 0.023 0.027 0.038 0.055 0.067 0.092 0.125 0.150 0.162 0.181 0.225 0.247 0.260 0.264 0.289 0.314 0.327 
                        
prop 80+  mean 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.018 0.021 0.024 0.032 0.045 0.053 0.070 0.093 0.107 0.110 0.120 0.148 0.156 0.159 0.159 0.168 0.185 0.195 
prop 80+  Median 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.018 0.021 0.024 0.032 0.045 0.052 0.070 0.092 0.106 0.107 0.117 0.144 0.152 0.154 0.151 0.161 0.178 0.190 
prop 80+  std 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.010 0.014 0.019 0.023 0.027 0.034 0.039 0.044 0.047 0.051 0.055 0.058 
 20 
China, proportion above age 65 
Ind Interval Sex 2004 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095 2100 
prop 65+ 0.025 tot 0.076 0.078 0.084 0.098 0.121 0.137 0.166 0.202 0.224 0.229 0.240 0.262 0.264 0.268 0.265 0.266 0.272 0.277 0.271 0.263 0.261 
prop 65+ 0.2 tot 0.077 0.079 0.086 0.100 0.125 0.143 0.176 0.215 0.244 0.254 0.269 0.297 0.305 0.309 0.307 0.311 0.319 0.323 0.320 0.320 0.322 
prop 65+ 0.4 tot 0.077 0.079 0.087 0.101 0.127 0.147 0.181 0.223 0.254 0.266 0.284 0.317 0.329 0.334 0.334 0.339 0.348 0.352 0.355 0.353 0.354 
prop 65+ 0.6 tot 0.078 0.079 0.087 0.103 0.129 0.150 0.185 0.229 0.262 0.277 0.297 0.334 0.349 0.355 0.358 0.365 0.377 0.383 0.384 0.383 0.386 
prop 65+ 0.8 tot 0.078 0.080 0.088 0.104 0.132 0.153 0.191 0.237 0.273 0.291 0.315 0.356 0.374 0.385 0.387 0.397 0.412 0.421 0.419 0.422 0.425 
prop 65+ 0.975 tot 0.079 0.081 0.090 0.107 0.136 0.161 0.203 0.255 0.298 0.324 0.354 0.401 0.430 0.444 0.450 0.465 0.482 0.498 0.507 0.515 0.513 
                        
prop 65+  mean 0.078 0.079 0.087 0.102 0.128 0.148 0.184 0.226 0.259 0.273 0.292 0.328 0.341 0.348 0.349 0.355 0.366 0.372 0.373 0.372 0.374 
prop 65+  Median 0.078 0.079 0.087 0.102 0.128 0.148 0.183 0.226 0.258 0.272 0.291 0.327 0.338 0.345 0.345 0.352 0.361 0.367 0.368 0.369 0.372 
prop 65+  std 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.013 0.018 0.022 0.028 0.035 0.041 0.045 0.048 0.051 0.055 0.058 0.060 0.061 0.063 
 
China, old-age dependency ratio, (65+ / 15-65) 
Ind Interval Sex 2004 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095 2100 
O_PRPA 0.025 tot 0.107 0.109 0.117 0.137 0.173 0.198 0.245 0.309 0.359 0.372 0.393 0.448 0.453 0.462 0.455 0.459 0.471 0.482 0.470 0.454 0.449 
O_PRPA 0.2 tot 0.107 0.109 0.118 0.138 0.177 0.205 0.257 0.329 0.389 0.414 0.447 0.518 0.536 0.549 0.549 0.561 0.583 0.595 0.592 0.587 0.594 
O_PRPA 0.4 tot 0.107 0.109 0.118 0.139 0.179 0.209 0.264 0.341 0.408 0.439 0.480 0.565 0.594 0.613 0.615 0.632 0.662 0.672 0.677 0.677 0.679 
O_PRPA 0.6 tot 0.108 0.109 0.118 0.140 0.181 0.212 0.270 0.351 0.423 0.459 0.510 0.606 0.646 0.669 0.677 0.704 0.738 0.763 0.764 0.766 0.778 
O_PRPA 0.8 tot 0.108 0.109 0.119 0.141 0.184 0.217 0.277 0.362 0.441 0.486 0.547 0.658 0.713 0.752 0.769 0.802 0.854 0.888 0.887 0.893 0.908 
O_PRPA 0.975 tot 0.108 0.109 0.119 0.143 0.188 0.225 0.293 0.391 0.487 0.550 0.638 0.785 0.882 0.951 0.986 1.038 1.133 1.197 1.223 1.263 1.277 
                        
O_PRPA  mean 0.108 0.109 0.118 0.140 0.180 0.211 0.267 0.347 0.416 0.451 0.498 0.592 0.630 0.656 0.664 0.687 0.726 0.747 0.752 0.751 0.760 
O_PRPA  Median 0.108 0.109 0.118 0.140 0.180 0.211 0.267 0.346 0.414 0.449 0.495 0.586 0.619 0.641 0.644 0.663 0.700 0.715 0.721 0.722 0.732 
O_PRPA  std 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.012 0.021 0.032 0.044 0.059 0.086 0.108 0.124 0.135 0.150 0.170 0.186 0.196 0.200 0.206 
 21 
China, total population 
Ind Interval Sex 2004 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095 2100 
ptotr 0.025 tot 1.266 1.270 1.287 1.300 1.299 1.285 1.255 1.216 1.172 1.116 1.060 0.986 0.917 0.847 0.787 0.721 0.676 0.630 0.594 0.554 0.517 
ptotr 0.2 tot 1.279 1.284 1.309 1.333 1.342 1.336 1.317 1.291 1.258 1.215 1.163 1.107 1.049 0.995 0.943 0.889 0.841 0.798 0.758 0.723 0.688 
ptotr 0.4 tot 1.286 1.292 1.323 1.352 1.366 1.365 1.352 1.333 1.307 1.273 1.230 1.175 1.123 1.079 1.035 0.986 0.934 0.895 0.859 0.823 0.793 
ptotr 0.6 tot 1.292 1.299 1.333 1.366 1.383 1.387 1.380 1.365 1.347 1.317 1.280 1.233 1.185 1.140 1.102 1.064 1.021 0.984 0.955 0.925 0.896 
ptotr 0.8 tot 1.299 1.306 1.345 1.383 1.405 1.413 1.414 1.407 1.396 1.377 1.347 1.308 1.271 1.237 1.201 1.163 1.127 1.090 1.067 1.048 1.028 
ptotr 0.975 tot 1.311 1.320 1.368 1.418 1.451 1.473 1.482 1.497 1.495 1.488 1.476 1.458 1.444 1.425 1.398 1.373 1.347 1.326 1.311 1.295 1.292 
                        
ptotr  mean 1.289 1.295 1.328 1.358 1.374 1.376 1.366 1.350 1.329 1.298 1.257 1.209 1.161 1.116 1.073 1.030 0.987 0.949 0.917 0.890 0.864 
ptotr  Median 1.289 1.296 1.328 1.359 1.375 1.377 1.366 1.350 1.326 1.294 1.252 1.206 1.157 1.109 1.064 1.017 0.973 0.930 0.900 0.874 0.847 
ptotr  std 0.011 0.013 0.021 0.029 0.038 0.047 0.058 0.070 0.082 0.095 0.107 0.118 0.130 0.141 0.152 0.162 0.171 0.179 0.187 0.193 0.199 
 
